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Abstract
Recent Pwn2Own competitions have demonstrated the
continued effectiveness of control hijacking attacks de-
spite deployed countermeasures including stack canaries
and ASLR. A powerful defense called Control flow In-
tegrity (CFI) offers a principled approach to preventing
such attacks. However, prior CFI implementations use
static analysis and must limit protection to remain prac-
tical. These limitations have enabled attacks against all
known CFI systems, as demonstrated in recent work.
This paper presents a cryptographic approach to con-
trol flow integrity (CCFI) that is both fine-grain and prac-
tical: using message authentication codes (MAC) to pro-
tect control flow elements such as return addresses, func-
tion pointers, and vtable pointers. MACs on these ele-
ments prevent even powerful attackers with random read/
write access to memory from tampering with program
control flow. We implemented CCFI in Clang/LLVM, tak-
ing advantage of recently available cryptographic CPU in-
structions. We evaluate our system on several large soft-
ware packages (including nginx, Apache and memcache)
as well as all their dependencies. The cost of protection
ranges from a 3–18% decrease in request rate.
1 Introduction
In recent years, sophisticated attacks on software vulner-
abilities have emerged, proving that deployed protection
mechanisms can be bypassed (e.g., [1–4] and many oth-
ers). The weaknesses in many deployed defenses is that
they focus on patching specific attack techniques rather
than addressing the fundamental problem. For exam-
ple, stack canaries [5] assume a stack overflow; non-
executable memory [6] assumes code injection; and ad-
dress space layout randomization [7] assumes that infor-
mation cannot be leaked. These defenses can be circum-
vented, for example, by overflowing the heap, executing
a chain of existing code fragments using return-oriented
programming, and leaking a pointer. A more principled
defense approach is needed.
Exploits often work by hijacking the program’s control
flow to execute unintended code, for example, to start a
shell. Indeed, all the attacks mentioned above work by
hijacking control flow and all the defenses mentioned try
to prevent specific approaches to control flow hijacking.
A principled solution, called control flow integrity
(CFI) [8], prevents an attacker from arbitrarily modifying
the target of indirect jumps (e.g., return addresses, func-
tion pointers). Ensuring control flow integrity would pre-
vent all attacks based on control flow hijacking, which
includes all the sophisticated attacks listed above.
However, practical implementations of CFI have been
shown to be insecure [9, 10] for two main reasons. First,
CFI uses static analysis to determine the target of a
pointer, which is not always precise and can lead to overly
permissive choices. Second, some run-time checks are re-
moved or simplified to reduce performance overhead.
In practice, existing CFI systems are very coarse-
grained and group function pointers and return addresses
into two different classes, preventing swaps between the
two. That is, a function pointer cannot be replaced with a
return address, however one can still swap two return ad-
dresses (or two function pointers). We are the first system
to enforce CFI using cryptography, and our system pro-
vides a fine-grain CFI implementation in attempt to avoid
arbitrary swaps.
Our contribution. We show that on modern proces-
sors fine-grain control flow integrity can be efficiently
achieved using cryptography. Our cryptographic control
flow integrity (CCFI) system identifies all objects that
would affect a program’s control flow (e.g., return ad-
dresses, function pointers) and computes a message au-
thentication code (MAC) of such objects each time they
are stored in memory. This MAC is stored along with
the object and checked every time the value is loaded
from memory. The random secret key used for comput-
ing these MACs is stored in dedicated registers so that it
can never leak by a memory disclosure bug. By checking
the MAC of every control-flow element before using it we
prevent the attacker from writing an arbitrary memory ad-
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dress into, say, a return address.
Moreover, we include metadata in the MAC to help
prevent an attacker from swapping any leaked function
pointers. This protection is somewhat analogous to replay
protection in cryptographic protocols, though not as com-
plete. We prevent any two pointers from being swapped
by MACing location as well as the value of pointers from
being swapped by MACing location as well as the value
of ever pointer. Moreover, we make it less likely for two
function pointers to pointers to reside at the same address
in a predictable way by randomizing every memory allo-
cation. We cannot prevent a particular pointer from being
replayed to an old value if the attacker knew both its old
value and MAC and can overwrite both, but this is the
least likely scenario to help an attacker.
Cryptographic CFI is a general enough to support im-
plementing all existing CFI systems that we are aware of,
by including the pointer class in each MAC computation.
Grouping pointers into classes that are represented by nu-
merical tags is used by all existing systems. There are four
or fewer classes in almost all existing system.
To argue security we assume a very powerful adver-
sary: one that has arbitrary read access to all of mem-
ory and write access to all writable control-flow elements
in memory (e.g., return addresses and function pointers).
We design our system so that, with the limited exception
of same-address pointer replay, even such a powerful ad-
versary cannot hijack control flow and cause unintended
code to run. At most the attacker can cause the program
to terminate due to a MAC failure.
The use of MACs in CCFI gives us several useful ad-
vantages over traditional CFI approaches using runtime
checks. First, hackers cannot generate MACs, they must
have previously observed a valid MAC. Second, rather
than relying on grouping pointers at compile-time, we can
group pointers based on runtime characteristics. For in-
stance our implementation binds a pointer to the address
at which it is stored, preventing an attacker from swap-
ping pointers. This is critical as static analysis is hard, not
practical with dynamic libraries, and leads to overly per-
missive checks. Third, MACs are flexible enough to allow
us to also group pointers based on compile time grouping,
e.g., type information, or return address versus function
pointers. Finally, our implementation uses the new AES-
NI instructions to efficiently compute the MAC in only 40
cycles, and so checks need not be omitted or simplified
for the sake of performance, at the cost of security.
We implemented CCFI in LLVM [11] for x86-64 and
recompiled SPEC2006, three web servers (Apache, Ng-
inx, Lighttpd), two cache servers (memcached, redis)
and all of their 21 dependencies. Only two packages
(libapr and Nginx) required code changes for compatibil-
ity, where manual MAC computations had to be inserted,
a total of three lines changed. The implementation is gen-
eralizable to any architecture that supports a fast crypto-
graphic MAC function. The web servers showed a re-
duced request throughput rate of only 3–18% when serv-
ing a static file. When running over SSL, which contends
for AES-NI register use, the overhead is 38%. This is a
reasonable overhead given the precision of CFI achieved.
Our results show that CCFI is practical, and we argue that
its level of security can finally put an end to control-flow
based attacks.
2 Background
Software vulnerabilities take all shapes and forms. The
classic example is a stack buffer overflow, where the lack
of bounds checking lets an attacker corrupt a return ad-
dress on the stack causing execution to jump to an arbi-
trary location, often leading to execution of arbitrary code.
Another example is sending data past the end of a buffer
over the network, possibly leaking sensitive information.
Yet another example is forgetting to include important au-
thentication steps in the program’s logic. We classify soft-
ware vulnerabilities and attacks as follows:
1. Control flow attacks result in the attacker being able
to execute arbitrary code. These are the most com-
mon exploits, and they typically yield a remote shell.
2. Data flow attacks result in the attacker being able to
read or write program memory, not necessarily lead-
ing to arbitrary code execution. OpenSSL’s heart-
bleed bug [12] is an example, where the attacker is
able to read the server’s private key from memory.
3. Logic errors result in the attacker being able to skip
checks. For example, Apple’s goto fail [13] bug did
not properly check SSL certificates allowing attack-
ers to mount man-in-the-middle attacks.
Our work focuses on the first class of attacks only. It is,
however, the most prevalent class of attack today and the
most powerful, because it allows the attacker to achieve
everything that other attack classes do. Running arbitrary
code lets an attacker disclose memory to leak SSL keys
or jump past any checks. Conversely, a data flow bug that
merely discloses memory (though still catastrophic) can-
not be used to execute a remote shell on the system.
The most widely deployed protections against control
flow attacks are stack canaries, non-executable memory
(NX), and address space layout randomization (ASLR).
Interestingly, none of these solutions protect the return ad-
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dress itself, which is what the attacker is after. Instead,
they attempt to stop the attack indirectly through other
means. In contrast, our CCFI directly protects return ad-
dresses and function pointers.
Control flow attacks generalize to exploit any indirect
branch (e.g., function pointers) which CCFI also protects.
In Section 9 we review related work on protecting func-
tion pointers such as PointGuard [14] as well as other
stack smashing defenses.
Control flow integrity. CFI [8] is a technique where
static analysis determines where an indirect jump can
land. Runtime checks are added to enforce that the jump
lands only to the valid locations that have been determined
ahead of time during static analysis. For example, sup-
pose that the pointer analysis determines that a function
pointer can only ever point to read or write. Then
the attacker cannot modify the function pointer to call
execve as that call is outside the set of valid locations
for that particular function pointer. Note, however, that
the attacker can still swap a read for a write, which
may be enough to conduct an attack.
More fundamentally, however, static analysis has lim-
its; there are cases where it cannot be determined where a
function pointer is allowed to point. In this case, the set
of valid locations can be any function whose address has
been taken. Worse, practical CFI implementations split
valid locations into only two sets: function pointers can
jump to any function whose address has been taken, and
return instructions can return to any return site. These
loose implementations are not enough as an attacker can
swap return sites to eventually execute arbitrary code and
break out of CFI [9, 10].
Our approach is tackling CFI from a cryptographic
point of view. We stop the attacker from modifying the
return address or function pointer in the first place rather
than restricting its values to a particular set (which may
be large enough for an attack). This approach does not
require static analysis and so does not inherit any of its
limitations. The pointer is secured via a MAC at runtime
when it is first stored in memory, and validated before use.
Function pointer swaps are avoided by preventing replay
attacks—i.e., a function pointer is valid in only one loca-
tion and cannot be reused elsewhere. This lets us provide
strong CFI guarantees that are not overly permissive.
3 Threat Model
Many security systems today (e.g., stack canaries, ASLR)
assume the attacker cannot read memory. An attacker
who can read arbitrary memory can easily defeat these
defenses as demonstrated in several recent papers [1, 4].
In this paper we assume a powerful attacker who has the
ability to read arbitrary areas of memory. Moreover, the
attacker can overwrite all writable control-flow elements
in memory (e.g., return addresses and function pointers).
However, the attacker is unable to write to executable
memory (marked read-only) or read the value of special
registers our compiler reserves. These are reasonable as-
sumptions that accurately model modern control hijacking
attacks.
4 Design
Our Cryptographic Control Flow Integrity (CCFI) system
is a compiler that protects any known object that may af-
fect the program’s control flow. Specifically, it protects:
• Return addresses and frame pointers.
• Function pointers.
• vtable pointers. The vtable is a (read-only) func-
tion pointer table used by C++. By swapping vtable
pointers, one can cause methods of a different class
to be invoked, therefore subverting control flow.
• Exception handlers.
There are other application dependent objects which
may eventually influence a program’s control flow. For
example, an integer may index a jump table, and if over-
written, the attacker may execute a different function. We
do not offer any automatic protection against such data-
flow attacks. The programmer can, however, use our
primitives (defined in Section 4.2) to manually protect
such sensitive objects.
CCFI protection is achieved using a MAC. Each time a
control-flow object is stored, its MAC is computed, and on
each load, its MAC is verified. The MAC is stored along-
side the object. Attackers cannot overwrite a control ob-
ject with an arbitrary value because they do not posses the
MAC key needed to produce a valid MAC for the object.
The MAC key is randomly generated at program start, and
stored in registers the CCFI compiler reserves (In x86-64
we use XMM5–XMM15). The key is never written to
memory because the recompiled applications and libraries
do not use these registers. Attackers cannot execute (mis-
aligned) code that accesses these registers because they
would have to break control flow in the first place.
Care must be taken to prevent replay attacks. For ex-
ample, an attacker must not be able to swap two function
pointers by reading a function pointer and its valid MAC
and using these elsewhere (in another function pointer).
To combat replay attacks we must first define what is in-
cluded in the MAC.
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4.1 MAC Function
Our MAC is implemented as a single block of AES ap-
plied to the input data. More precisely, the MAC function
is defined as follows:
MAC(K, pointer, class)
AES-128(K, { pointer, class })
Where K is the key, and pointer is the object being se-
cured and class is the pointer class. In all practical CFI
implementations, both runtime and compile time, pointers
are grouped into classes. In the original CFI work, there
were two classes function pointers and return pointers. In
our scheme this can easily be represented by a one or zero.
Fine grain CFI may group function pointers based on us-
age or type signature and create thousands of classes. Any
modern CFI system that we know about can use MACs
instead of weak runtime checks, which can then benefit
from including runtime groupings to offer better security.
Runtime groupings have several benefits. Current CFI
systems must determine a fixed set of functions within a
class and these are stored as read-only tables, otherwise an
attacker could attack the tables used to verify control flow
integrity. As an example CCFI can use addresses where
pointers are stored to prevent swapping function pointers,
this is not possible at compile time. Another benefit is that
the size of runtime class can always be smaller or equal
to the size of compile time classes. To see why this is
imagine a function pointer has one of five valid values, at
runtime the attacker may only see three of them because
of the program’s state. Thus the attacker can never exploit
the remaining two states until the program has generated
those pointers.
Our implementation defines the class as follows:
class :=
{ {0,old f rameaddress} For return addresses
{1,address} For function pointers
Our system uses the address of the pointer as the
class for function pointers with the highest bit set. On the
x86-64 architecture only 48 bits of virtual address space
are used, thus leaving us with the 16-bits that we can mod-
ify safely. For return pointers we use the old frame pointer
as our class. Setting the most significant bit for function
pointers gives us domain separation that ensures an at-
tacker cannot use a function pointer as a return address
and vice versa.
The 64-bit pointer is concatenated with its 64-bit
class to form a 128-bit AES block, which is then en-
crypted using AES with a 128 bit key. Our implementa-
tion crucially leverages the AES-NI instructions available
on the Intel x86-64 architecture [15] to minimize the per-
formance impact of these computations.
Including the pointer address in the MAC data ensures
that an attacker cannot swap a pointer stored in one mem-
ory address with a pointer stored in a different memory
address. However, the attacker can still replace a pointer
stored at location x at time t with a pointer stored at the
same location x at time t ′ < t. We refer to this as a replay
attack and discuss defenses against it in Section 4.7.
Our approach generalizes to any hardware supporting
fast MACs. Hardware support for AES, SHA-1, and
SHA-256 are available or will be available on many mod-
ern architectures. This enables efficient implementation
of CCFI on many modern platforms: ARM 64-bit ar-
chitecture includes support for these instructions and im-
plementations will be widely available for server deploy-
ments later this year [16]. The latest SPARC and the Pow-
erPC architecture include AES instructions [17].
HMAC-SHA-256 is a good alternative to our AES-
based MAC. HMAC may offer performance benefits be-
cause it requires fewer registers for the key schedule and
MAC computation. At the time of writing the SHA-1/256
instructions are not yet available on x86 to offer a point of
comparison.
4.2 Protection Primitives
CCFI protection is built on two main primitives that we
provide as compiler intrinsics. This enables our system
and an application programmer to use these intrinsics to
protect any values they deem vulnerable. Listing 1 shows
the two intrinsics as exposed to the C programming lan-
guage on x86.
Listing 1: Compiler intrinsics for protecting and checking
a pointer’s integrity.
__m128d
__builtin_ccfi_macptr(uint64_t ptr,
uint64_t class);
uint64_t
__builtin_ccfi_checkptr(uint64_t ptr,
uint64_t class);
The first intrinsic builtin ccfi macptr it used
to protect a pointer. It computes the MAC of the function
pointer and the class. The MAC is then stored in a region
of memory indexed by the address argument.
The second intrinsic builtin ccfi checkptr
recomputes the MAC and compares it against the previ-
ously saved MAC. If they are not identical it will return a
zero value.
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These two primitives can be used by a programmer to
protect application specific objects that may affect control
flow, like, for example, an index to a jump table.
4.3 Stack Protection
To protect stack-based control flow objects, on each func-
tion prologue, we MAC both the saved return address and
frame pointer (instead of address). A slot on the stack is
reserved to store the MAC. In the epilogue, we verify the
MAC before returning to the caller. MACing the frame
pointer prevents exploits that, for example, reposition the
upper stack frame to pop and return to unexpected return
addresses [6].
We further optimize leaf functions (functions that do
not call out any other functions) by storing the return ad-
dress in a register rather than memory thereby eliminating
the need to MAC their return address.
4.4 Pointer Protection
Function pointers and vtable pointers are protected in the
same way. They both point to read-only memory so only
the pointer itself needs protection. On a store, the MAC is
computed, and on a load, the MAC is checked. Logically,
the MAC should be stored side-by-side with the pointer.
We use a different, simpler, implementation that does not
require resizing function pointers, structures and classes.
It stores the MAC in an external table, indexed by the lo-
cation of the pointer. A simple hash function can be used
to translate a pointer’s address to a slot in the hash table.
C++ adds some complexity in protecting pointers.
Pointers to member functions of classes are represented
by a pair of 64-bit values. If the first value is not odd, then
it is the address of a non-virtual function. Otherwise, a
virtual function is being pointed to, and the second 64-bit
value indicates the index in the vtable.
Constructors need to be extended to MAC the vtable
pointer as the object is being instantiated. Care must
be taken to support vtable tables (VTTs), a condition
that arises from multiple inheritance when derived classes
share a common base (C++’s diamond problem).
4.5 Other Control Flow Protections
We must also protect other sensitive pointers, specifi-
cally the global offset table (GOT) and global destructors
(.dtors). The GOT is used for dynamic linking and
filled by the loader with the addresses of external library
functions. Global destructors (like global constructors)
are function pointers registered at program load time and
executed at program termination.
To protect these we use an existing mechanism,
RELRO [18], which computes relocations at program
load time and marks the GOT and .dtors read-only.
This prevents the attacker from tampering with these sen-
sitive pointers.
4.6 Compatibility
Because our MAC protects the location of a control
pointer, each time a control pointer is copied, the MAC
must be recomputed. This is not a problem for return
addresses and vtable pointers because they are not ex-
posed to programmers so our system can take care that
they are properly handled. Function pointers, however,
can be copied by the programmer. When type information
is preserved, the CCFI compiler can detect that a function
pointer is being copied and automatically recompute the
MAC for the copy. If, however, a function pointer is cast
to another type and then copied, the compiler cannot de-
tect that a function pointer is being copied so the MAC is
not recomputed. The result is that if the function pointer
is later used, a MAC failure will occur. MAC check will
always be present because a function pointer must be cast
to a function pointer type before being used so the system
will err in the favor of safety.
In practice, we observed two programs that copy point-
ers around after casting them to void, using memcpy.
Apache and nginx both have a dynamic array implementa-
tion which stores its elements in a void* memory region,
and copies them using memcpy if the array is resized.
This array is used for storing function pointers. These
cases were easy to detect in practice because the programs
would crash at initialization (due to MAC failures).
We wrote a simpler static analyzer to help program-
mers find cases where type information is lost for function
pointers and manual MAC checks may be necessary. The
Nginx compatibility issue was in fact found by our tool.
4.7 Replay Attacks
Replay attacks in cryptography exist because an attacker
can record a properly signed message and send it again
(without modification) at a later time. Protection against
replay attacks in cryptography is done by including a
counter or nonce in every message so that the verifier can
detect replayed messages.
In the context of CCFI, we compute the MAC on a
pointer and its address. The address functions as a (naive)
nonce. However, it is still possible to replace the cur-
rent pointer at location x with an old pointer previously
stored at location x and potentially disrupt control flow.
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We stress that this is the only attack possible with our ba-
sic MAC method. This problem does not exist with glob-
als, because they can exist in only one place, and their
address effectively acts as a unique nonce. The problem
with the heap and stack is that the nonce (i.e., the address)
can be reused.
One approach to fixing potential replays is to add ran-
domness to every memory allocation (including stack
frames) to prevent addresses from aligning. This reduces
the likelihood that two function pointers share the same
memory address (and hence same nonce), which prevents
replay attacks. Our final CCFI design MACs the object’s
data and address and furthermore randomizes allocations
as described in Section 5.2. An alternative that does not
rely on randomization is discussed in Section 8.
Our stack and heap randomization, used to mitigate re-
play attacks, is quite different from randomization used in
ASLR. ASLR is applied once at program startup to pre-
vent an attacker from predicting the address of memory
objects. Our randomization is applied on every allocation
to prevent two function pointers from always being allo-
cated to the same address. Some systems like OpenBSD
already randomize this way: every call to malloc re-
turns a random memory chunk. We similarly randomly
pad stack frames to prevent two return addresses from al-
ways being placed in the same stack address. This way
even if the same call graph is executed multiple times, the
location of any return address and local function pointer
will vary.
5 Implementation
Our system is built on the Clang/LLVM compiler frame-
work and supports x86 64, tested on FreeBSD. The im-
plementation consists of the following major components:
• Memory randomization: A change in libc’s
malloc to return random memory chunks, and an
LLVM function pass that randomly offsets the stack
pointer on each call. This further prevents replay at-
tacks.
• LLVM Target: ABI changes to reserve registers to
ensure the compiler never leaks the key. Implement
stack protection into the target specific code.
• Compiler Intrinsics: macptr and checkptr
compiler intrinsics are implemented as machine spe-
cific code and made available to the C language.
• Pointer Protection: This is a high-level LLVM pass
that identifies critical function pointers and vtable
pointers that must be protected. A small runtime li-
Registers SysV ABI CCFI ABI
xmm0-xmm3 Arguments Arguments
xmm4 Arguments Temporary*
xmm5-xmm7 Arguments Expanded Key
xmm8-xmm15 Temporary Expanded Key
Table 1: Shows how the XMM register usage in the
AMD64 SysV ABI differs from that of our ABI. The
general purpose registers, float point stack and MMX reg-
isters remain unchanged in the new ABI. The changes
only affect the XMM registers, which are used for float-
ing point and vector operations. *When optimizing pro-
tection for leaf functions stack protection uses XMM4 to
store the return instruction pointer and frame pointer.
brary provides error reporting and handling of glob-
als in a central place to reduce the increase in code
size.
• Static analysis tool: This finds any possible code
that may break our automatic MAC protection be-
cause function pointers are being copied without
type information and hence the MAC is not being
automatically recomputed by the CCFI compiler.
Any application wishing to be hardened with CCFI
must be recompiled along with all of its dependencies.
We provide a command-line compatible wrapper to clang
and clang++.
5.1 ABI Changes
We implemented our MAC using the AES-NI instructions
on x86. These instructions take their arguments in XMM
registers. A 128-bit AES key expands to 11 128-bit val-
ues, requiring 11 XMM registers (each 128-bits wide) to
hold the key.
XMM registers are normally used for floating point and
vector operations in the AMD64 ABI specification. They
are also used for argument passing. We must therefore re-
serve 11 of these registers to hold our expanded key. An
additional scratch XMM register is needed while comput-
ing the AES rounds. This register must not be used for ar-
gument passing or it would be clobbered during our AES
computation during the function’s prologue. It can, how-
ever, be used in the function’s body as a temporary. Ta-
ble 1 shows how we change the ABI we made to manage
our AES encryption.
The ABI change reduces the available registers for
floating point and vector computation to only five. This
limits the compiler’s ability to keep more variables in the
registers and thus can have a substantial impact on per-
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formance. Code that does not use floating point or vector
math operations should not notice a performance impact
from this change. Some programs use the XMMs also
for copying memory, zeroing memory, and similar opera-
tions. These tasks typically require only one or two XMM
registers.
5.2 Memory Randomization
To prevent replay attacks where control pointers align,
each memory and stack frame allocation is randomized.
The basic idea is to add a random offset to each malloc
and stack frame. There is a trade-off between how much
virtual memory to waste and how much entropy to add.
OpenBSD already implements this for malloc and we
use their same entropy parameter of four bits.
We implemented randomized allocations in FreeBSD’s
libc malloc by adding a random offset to each allocated
chunk. Unlike OpenBSD, we are not allowed to store a
randomness source in memory because the attacker can
modify this as per our threat model. Instead, we are re-
quired to use registers. Ideally we would use Intel’s ran-
dom instruction [19]. This was not available on our pro-
cessor so in the interim we chose to use the CPU’s cycle
counter. The attacker would have to both align memory
layout and time (at a cycle granularity) to conduct an at-
tack.
Stack randomization is implemented similarly. On each
function prologue, we alloca a random size which has
the effect of padding the stack frame by a random value.
5.3 Stack Protection
Our stack protection mechanism allocates a local variable
to store the MAC of return address and frame pointer. The
prologue of a function generates the MAC and stores it.
The epilogue must recompute the MAC, and compare it,
and crash the program if the MAC does not match. In the
event of a bad MAC, it crashes the program by storing ze-
ros in the return address and (if there is one) frame pointer,
which saves a few instructions and avoids a branch.
The leaf optimization for stack protection stores the
return instruction pointer and frame pointer in XMM4.
Rather than encrypting it we just verify that it has not been
modified. Since leaf functions do not make any calls we
can safely rely on a register to store the value.
5.4 Compiler Intrinsics
The two portable intrinsics checkptr and macptr are
exposed to the programmer and to our protection pass.
Their implementation is machine specific depending on
the availability of cryptographic instructions. We imple-
mented ours using the AES-NI x86 instructions. These
primitives depend on our ABI changes and never leak any
part of the expanded key on to the stack.
Both primitives are implemented using a large in-
memory hash table that stores the generated MACs. The
hash table approach allows us to avoid the complexity as-
sociated with wide pointers. Ideally, we would eventually
support wide pointers, but this makes incremental deploy-
ment more difficult as one cannot mix libraries compiled
with and without CCFI as types now have different sizes.
Using a hash table causes additional performance over-
head due to the computation of the hash function and po-
tential cache misses associated with accessing a separate
hash table. We intend to support wide pointers in the fu-
ture to eliminate these issues.
5.5 Pointer Protection
The pointer protection is a module pass which does two
things. First, it goes through each basic block to find
loads and stores of function pointers, adding calls to
checkptr and macptr respectively. Care must be
taken to recursively walk every structure, array and vec-
tor so that nested function pointers are found. When a
structure is copied, the code results in an LLVM memcpy
intrinsic. These structures may contain function pointers
so we must verify and recompute the MAC of the function
pointer when this occurs.
The second action of the module pass is to go through
all globals and identify any function pointers (even within
structures) that are defined. These must be MACed before
starting the program. We create constructor functions that
add MACs to those. This is not necessary for globally de-
fined C++ objects because actual constructor code, where
the MAC is set, will be called.
Some systems calls take or return function pointers. No
special handling is needed when these pointers reside in
registers, as the compiler already checks function pointers
when they are loaded into registers. However, some sys-
tem calls, such as sigaction, exchange structures con-
taining function pointers. Instead of modifying the kernel,
we modified libc to check pointers in argument structures
and MAC those in return structures.
5.5.1 Runtime
The runtime mostly provides common functions to limit
binary size bloat. We have a constructor function that is
executed on program launch to allocate a memory region
for MAC storage (our hash table). A global MAC helper
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function helps reduce the instantiations of the macptr in-
trinsics inside constructors. Lastly, we provide a function
to call on failure to help with debugging and identifying
whether it might be a program issue (e.g., missing MAC
on untyped function pointer copy) or attack.
5.6 Static Analysis Tool
We wrote a static analysis tool using Clang’s static ana-
lyzer to find any code which may circumvent the auto-
matic MACing of function pointers and therefore cause
bogus MAC failures. It can be invoked as a wrapper to
make to analyze an entire application. It detects and flags
the following cases:
• A memcpy where both supplied arguments (before
casting) are of type void*. These could be pointers
to data structures containing function pointers cast
to void* in another object file. In our test applica-
tions, so far we found this to be the only case where
we miss function pointer copies.
• Any place where a function pointer is cast to a non-
function pointer type e.g., unsigned long, or void*.
• Any place where a non-function pointer type is cast
back to a function pointer.
We also provide users with a utility function,
ccfi memcpy, that can be useful for debugging MAC
failures due to memcpying untyped function pointers
around. Our ccfi memcpy analyzes the region being
copied and checks if a MAC is associated with any of the
elements in the memory region. If so, the MAC is re-
computed in the new region. We used this in Nginx and
libapr for example, where function pointers were being
memcpyied without type information and the MAC had
to be recomputed.
6 Security Analysis
6.1 Address Aliasing
Our weakest design point is that two different pointers
may be stored at the same address, and an attacker could
swap those pointers if he happens to have observed both
of them and their corresponding MACs. Programs them-
selves may write two different pointers to the same vari-
able, but swapping these two is valid from the perspec-
tive of the control flow graph. We only need to prevent
unrelated variables aliasing to the same address. The ran-
domization of stack and heap layout helps to mitigate this
by reducing the probability that pointers alias to the same
address. Also return addresses and function pointers use
different MAC schemes making them fundamentally in-
compatible.
One way future work could strengthen this is to use a
slab allocator to store objects of the same type in the same
virtual address space without any possible overlap with
other objects. As pointed out in our ideal model this can
over be difficult and some types hide the full type infor-
mation to be able to implement this. Randomization could
be used for the remaining types we cannot reason about.
Lastly, types that do not contain sensitive pointers may be
a shared heap.
The return stack may be addressed using a slab alloca-
tor in combination with segmented stacks. The goal again
is to prevent address space reuse for the stack. Local sen-
sitive pointers, and return pointers will be protected. One
caveat though, similar to all fine-grain CFI approaches we
know about, this technique would still allow an attacker
to return to any function that is a valid return target for the
current function.
Another avenue for improving the defense is to add
a hash of the type signature of functions into macptr
and checkptr. This would prevent two pointers of differ-
ent types from being swapped as the type signature hash
would be statically defined in the code using and creat-
ing pointers. This doesn’t prevent pointers with the same
type signature and very different meanings from being
swapped. C programs often cast function pointer types,
e.g., when arguments are unused, which we can address
by verifying and recomputing the MAC with the new type
signature.
6.2 Pointer Table Indices
Program data that can modify control flow is vulnerable,
and we do not defend against this in any way. Developers
should use our macptr and checkptr intrinsics to protect
indices into function tables and critical conditional values
(i.e., whether a connection is authenticated or not).
7 Evaluation
We evaluate two aspects:
1. Do applications break? When copying function
pointers, they must be reMACed. This will not occur
automatically if a function pointer is cast to a non-
function pointer type.
2. What is the overhead of the MAC computations and
checks?
All performance benchmarks were conducted on a
computer running FreeBSD 10.0 powered by dual Intel
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Xeon E5620 processors running at 2.4 GHz with four
cores each. The machine had 48 GBs of RAM and an Intel
SSD. A second identical machine running Ubuntu Linux
was directly connected via gigabit Ethernet to launch the
network benchmarks.
7.1 Application Compatibility
We compiled 21 libraries, 5 servers, and SPEC CINT2006
using CCFI. Out of these, we only had to modify two
lines in libapr and a single line in nginx, all of which
copied function pointers over with memcpy, breaking our
MAC. In both cases, the programs (nginx and Apache us-
ing libapr) crashed upon initialization due to a null MAC.
We ran our static analysis on nginx and it pointed out
three dangerous calls to memcpy. Two were in a variable
sized array implementation which would memcpy its el-
ements to a new buffer when resizing. The third was in
a resolver code. Sixteen calls to function pointers being
cast to void types were spotted. All of these were calls to
push function pointers into the array implementation con-
taining the memcpy. This information directly pointed
us to the problematic memcpy. Interestingly, libapr had
the same exact problem. A custom array implementation
was used to store function pointers in non-function pointer
typed memory.
OpenSSL is a heavy user of function pointers and we
were able to run it unmodified. We had to disable some of
the assembly optimizations that used our reserved XMM
registers. We could have modified the assembly code to
save and restore our key in YMM registers. In fact, we
are looking to implement this directly in LLVM to auto-
matically support hand written assembly code that uses
our reserved XMMs.
7.2 Microbenchmarks
Our system proposes to compute AES on every call, re-
turn and indirect branch. This seems like a high price to
pay but the key to making this practical is the low latency
offered by the AES-NI instructions.
Table 2 shows the latency in cycles for each of our in-
trinsic functions which essentially run AES on a single
block. We see that the MAC computation and verification
is approximately 40 cycles.
Table 3 examines how the MAC computation time ef-
fects function call and return times in cycles. This is our
worst case performance because the function does not do
any work. Stack protection adds approximately 63 cycles
to the function (70-7). This value is less than twice the av-
erage MAC computation time because it is the operation
latency. The function prologue’s latency can be hidden
Operation Cycles
macptr intrinsic 40
checkptr intrinsic 39
Table 2: Shows the cycles for computing or checking
a function pointer. This is only the intrinsic and ex-
cludes the conditional statements that are inserted when
checkptr fails.
Operation Baseline Ptr Prot. CCFI
Func. call 7 - 70
Fptr. call 7 50 153
Mthd. call 8 53 156
Vptr. call 17 60 164
Table 3: Shows the round-trip function call and return for
an empty function in cycles. The baseline numbers in-
clude no protection using an unmodified compiler. CCFI
without stack protection shows the overhead when only
function pointer protection is enabled. The CCFI column
shows the results with stack and function pointer protec-
tion enabled.
partly by the function’s body and epilogue computation.
The epilogue latency could also be hidden if we schedule
useful (but safe) work to occur after the MAC verification.
Any function performing significant amount of computa-
tion will mask our fixed overhead of 70 cycles.
The function pointer call latency is listed in the second
row. We see that function pointer protection costs an addi-
tional 43 cycles. When enable both this numbers increases
to 153 cycles.
Finally, two C++ call benchmarks: a non-virtual
method pointer call and a virtual method pointer call are
shown. Calls made through method pointers are more
expensive because C++ on x86 lowers them into an if-
statement that either calls the vtable entry if it is virtual
otherwise calls the pointer directly. Virtual calls are the
most expensive because of the extra vtable access.
Overall, CCFI adds a fixed overhead ranging from 70–
164 cycles to function calls. Any function doing signif-
icant work will amoritize this fixed latency. As a refer-
ence point, a single cache miss is 300 cycles on modern
machines. Larger functions enable the processor to take
advantage of instruction reordering and speculative exe-
cution to hide some of this latency. These processor op-
timizations explain the non-linearity visible in this table.
We evaluate application benchmarks next to measure the
overall effect.
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7.3 SPEC2006 Benchmarks
Figure 1 shows the results from the SPEC CPU2006 in-
teger benchmarks. We omitted the GCC and Perl bench-
marks as they crashed when compiled with the modern
vanilla GCC or Clang compilers that we tested. All other
benchmarks worked both with Clang and CCFI, with no
changes to the benchmark source code.
The Figure uses an unmodified Clang 3.3 compiler as
the baseline and the other results are normalized to this
measurement. We also measured the overhead of the ABI
changes alone which put register pressure, but the result
was negligible so we did not plot it. All the overhead
comes from stack and function pointer protection.
We show the results of SPEC for full protection with
and without the leaf optimization for stack frames. The
stack protection overhead appears as the lower half of the
bar in each of the two cases. We measured an average of
45% overhead for all benchmarks, and 23% overhead for
the C benchmark.
Function pointer protection overhead becomes more
apparent in the C++ benchmarks that we have measured.
This is because inheritance depends on vtable pointers
that must be protected. The C code has very few hot paths
containing function pointers thus why we do not see a sig-
nificant performance difference between stack protection
alone and full protection.
7.4 Stack leaf optimization gains
Our stack protection cost dominates in small functions.
The effect worsens when such functions are called fre-
quently. To better understand this behavior, we study our
worst and best cases from SPEC (omnetpp and bzip). Fig-
ures 2 and 3 show the approximate total cost per func-
tion (instruction count × number of calls) for omnetpp
and bzip2, when using different compilers. Each curve
is sorted by function cost. The gap between the top curve
(stack protection) and the bottom curve (vanilla compiler)
shows the overhead of stack protection. The middle curve
approximates the cost graph with the leaf optimization. In
the omnetpp case, there are many frequent calls to smaller
functions (typical in C++) and hence the higher overhead.
This is indicated by the middle curve that hugs the unop-
timized curve on the left side of the graph (costly func-
tions). On the remainder of the graph however the op-
timization pays back as it sits between the baseline and
unoptimized curve. Our leaf optimization reduces a 5x
overhead to 3.5x.
C code represented by bzip2 has many calls to larger
functions that is indicated by the lines overlapping for
most of the graph. The optimization has a smaller impact
Configuration Vanilla CCFI
Nginx (https) 207 128
Nginx 16482 14103
Lighttpd 22714 18516
Apache 25305 24537
Table 4: Webserver request throughput.
Configuration Vanilla CCFI
memcached 283403 276006
redis 107527 88496
Table 5: Cache server request throughput.
on overall performance as stack protection contributes to
a smaller percentage of a functions execution time.
More aggressive function inlining with link time opti-
mization (LTO) should bring down the cost of C++ for
real world uses. Pointer protection could be eliminated
for many small accessor functions that are executed very
frequently by inlining.
7.5 Applications
We compiled a number of high performance servers and
all their dependencies with CCFI. Table 4 shows the re-
quest rate when comparing a vanilla build of the system
compared to CCFI. We used default settings for all servers
and the ApacheBench benchmarking tool. In the HTTP
case, there is a 3–18% overhead depending on the server
used.
In the HTTPS case, performance drops by 38% for two
reasons. First, we disabled some of the assembly code
in OpenSSL which used XMM registers 5–15. Second,
all the intensive math C code felt the XMM register pres-
sure. Although we disabled OpenSSL’s AES-NI imple-
mentation, we used FreeBSD’s cryptodev kernel AES-
NI implementation for high speed AES. This comes at
the cost of a system call but is amortized for large mes-
sages (anything over 128 bytes will break even). Fur-
ther performance improvements would require changes to
OpenSSL’s code. Specifically, all assembly optimizations
would have to be enabled, and for those using many XMM
registers, CCFI’s XMMs registers would have to be saved
and restored in YMMs.
We also measured the performance of memcached and
redis, shown in Table 5. We used the mutilate tool to
benchmark memcached, and redis’ own benchmark tool
for redis. The performance degradation is between 3–
18%.
These results are promising for securing network
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Figure 2: Shows the approximate performance cost of the
top 220 functions for omnetpp, a C++ benchmark, with
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smaller sized functions that appear in the graph as the
large gap between the vanilla and unoptimized lines. Our
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tions are executed few times and are not very long thus
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servers where most of the overhead comes from IO or
complex application code.
8 Discussion
8.1 Hardware Mechanisms
Our CCFI work preserves the immutability of objects
through cryptography. Other implementation approaches
include using other hardware mechanisms like paging.
For example, a shadow memory can be used for storing
function pointers. This memory is made available only
prior to indirect call or jump instructions. Switching page
tables using a tagged TLB (or invlpg instruction) could be
one implementation. More promising is Supervisor Mode
Access Protection (SMAP), an upcoming feature that pre-
vents kernels from accessing user space memory. An ef-
ficient instruction is available to toggle when a kernel is
able to read user memory. This feature could be used in a
system like Dune [20] by running a process in privileged
mode, but storing function pointers in user space memory.
Before a call, the SMAP bit can be flipped to access user
space memory, and the bit can then be toggled back in a
function prologue.
Another way to defend the return stack is to use hard-
ware performance counters to verify the integrity of the
return stack. This by itself has been done in previous
work [21] to have the operating system kernel check the
last few stack frames. The technique could be applied to
user level, but at an increased cost to the function epi-
logue. Another approach would be to store a few return
addresses in registers. When the registers reserved are all
full we would batch MAC and store these values on the
stack. This optimization allows us to exploit parallelism
available in the AES-NI implementation. We could see as
much as a four time reduction in stack protection costs.
This technique could help us defend against more sophis-
ticated stack smashing attacks without the need for ran-
domization. Potentially by doing a more expensive MAC
computation.
Most existing CFI systems operate on binaries by dis-
assembling them and instrumenting them. Our approach
was to modify the compiler and so we require sources or a
recompilation of binaries. We could implement CCFI for
unmodified binaries using a system like Pin [22].
8.2 Avoiding Address Space Reuse
Eliminating the use per-frame stack and per-object heap
randomization can offer stronger security guarantees. A
simple fix to this is to never reallocate address space to
different types of objects or stack frames. This will guar-
antee that two different sensitive pointers will never over-
lap in the same address space. For the heap we will take
any object that contains a sensitive pointer and give it a
unique pool based on its type to allocate from. The stack
on the other hand would require segmented stacks that
is supported by LLVM to ensure that stack segments be-
longing to different functions never reuse address space.
With no address space reuse our MACs would always be
unique and give us a stronger guarantee than any CFI sys-
tem alone.
The heap change may even gain us performance from
better cache utilization, which is one goal of slab and pool
allocators [23]. The stack change will cost performance
as an allocation is required per-frame, but we can benefit
from existing work on stack segmentation as it is used in
many languages today.
8.3 Just-in-Time Compilers
Our threat model lets an attacker write to any memory,
but assumes that executable pages are read-only. Modern
JITs often require that pages are marked writable and ex-
ecutable at the same time. One approach is to implement
the JIT as an external process. The JIT agent will share a
region of memory with the main process as read-only and
executable. The agent can then emit code and generate
valid MACs to pointers to be used by the JIT runtime.
This design hopes to prevent attackers from using the
JIT to jump to arbitrary code fragments or write into exe-
cutable memory. Only allowing the JIT to create pointers
with valid MACs allows us to omit any oracle functions
inside the main process. The JIT may never reuse an entry
point as it cannot revoke the MAC once generated, but we
can reuse memory with the exception the entry point byte
that would be replaced with an invalid instruction.
9 Related Work
Modern operating systems in conjunction with compilers
implement several security features. Address Space Lay-
out randomization [24] attempts to randomize a program
and libraries location in memory to make stack smashing
attacks against known binaries difficult. In addition most
popular compilers including support for stack cookies that
attempt to detect stack smashing attacks [5]. These sys-
tems both require recompilation of software and have
been circumvented by attackers for years in 32-bit sys-
tems. The BROP attack showed that a generalized attack
was practical even on 64-bit systems without knowledge
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of the binary. While these solutions raise the attack’s com-
plexity it offers no principled security.
After the initial CFI implementation [8] was introduced
by Abadi et al. there are now many CFI systems built on
static analysis techniques to achieve security. All these
systems classify pointers into several categories such as
call-sites and function pointers. Arguably the most secure
of these is CCFIR [25] that only classifies pointers into
four categories. This along with the difficulty of achiev-
ing compatibility within the limits of static analysis has
lead to practical attacks on all known CFI systems [9,10].
Cryptographic CFI offers the first new approach to CFI
since the original paper. Unlike existing CFI systems we
require binaries and libraries to be recompiled, as existing
libraries may leak our key or destroy it.
Forward edge CFI is a new system that enforces fine-
grain classification for function pointer only [26]. Like
CCFI, forward edge CFI offers fine grain classification of
function pointers, but does nothing for return addresses.
Return addresses are left unprotected falling back to ex-
isting mechanisms that are known to be weak. As with
previous CFI systems, forward edge CFI does not have
the runtime benefits that CCFI does.
Another very related work is PointGuard [14]. The
PointGuard system exclusive-or’s all function pointers
with a random value chosen at startup. In a way this
can be thought of like pointer encryption except it as-
sumes that attackers will only read or modify a single
pointer. Once an attacker has read several pointers the
secret exclusive-or value can be computed. Cryptograph-
ically secure encryption (or MAC’ing) by itself provides
little as functions can be swapped. CCFI improvement
over PointGuard is realizing the connection between in-
puts to a MAC and CFI. Another problem is that modi-
fying pointers in-place meant that a lot more program/li-
brary changes are required. Pointers had to be manually
decrypted/encrypted when issuing system calls.
Several systems use memory protection hardware to
protect the return stack such as shadow stack. The Stack-
Ghost system relied on register windows and OS support
on the SPARC architecture to provide stack smashing pro-
tection [27]. StackShield implemented a shadow stack
using the data segment so that it would not be suscepti-
ble to stack smashing attacks [28]. These systems do not
protect local function pointers stored on the stack. Some
shadow stack implementations on x86 use segmentation
to isolate the shadow stack, such that an attacker could not
overwrite it without the use of a special instruction prefix.
This CPU feature is not supported by any popular archi-
tecture today including x86-64 and thus an attacker with
a stronger threat model could attack the shadow stack.
Another hardware based approach kBouncer [21] used
performance counters on x86 to record the last few stack
entries, and have the operating system verify it during the
execution of a system call. This technique only protects
the top few levels (2–16 depending on the processor sup-
port) of the stack.
10 Conclusion
We showed that cryptographic control flow integrity is
a viable approach to protecting program control flow on
modern processors. Our system ensures that an attacker
who has random read access to memory cannot tamper
with control flow data, such as return addresses and func-
tion pointers, without being detected. While attackers can
cause the program to crash, they cannot alter control flow
to execute code of their choice.
Our implementation of CCFI classifies pointers by the
address at which they are stored and a single bit to dif-
ferentiate return pointers from function functions. Classi-
fying pointers by a runtime attribute (addresses) was not
previously possible. With no static analysis our modified
Clang/LLVM compiler can build protected binaries with
fine grain control flow integrity.
Our implementation is general enough to integrate with
fine grain CFI, when a practical CFI analysis is made
available in Clang. This can work in conjunction with our
address based classification to restrict control flow further
than any compile-time solution can.
We experimented with our CCFI system on a number of
large software packages. In all cases the packages com-
piled with no problems after changing at most one line of
code in each package.
Clearly a cryptographic system that provides strong
control flow protection must incur some performance
cost. By optimizing the system and leveraging hardware
support for AES available in modern processors we were
able to achieve between 3–18% slowdown over the unpro-
tected system. In many environments this is a worthwhile
trade off given the strong protection it provides.
This work shows how to protect control flow structures,
but does not protect other data in memory. It would be
interesting to explore extending the cryptographic protec-
tion described in this work to protect other memory struc-
tures, including structures holding application data. This
will potentially prevent attacks that exploit data flow vul-
nerabilities such as Heartbleed [12]. We leave this as an
interesting direction for future work.
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